Introduction
In December 1999 the Turkish government launched an exchange-rate-based stabilization program with the support of the Bretton Woods Institutions in order to bring down inflation and check what looked like an unsustainable process of public debt accumulation. The program appeared to be on course in the subsequent nine months, enjoying wide public confidence and support as well as gaining praise from IMF officials. However, it started running into problems in Autumn 2000, necessitating a relatively large IMF bailout to keep it on course. After a few months of muddling through it became clear that the program was not viable, and in the face of massive attacks on the currency and rapid exit of capital, the currency peg had to be abandoned in February 2001 and replaced by a regime of free floating, again on advice from the IMF. As in most other episodes of financial crisis the currency overshot, interest rates rose sharply and the economy contracted at an unprecedented rate. After another bailout package from the IMF, financial and currency markets stabilized towards the end of the year, but employment and economic activity remained depressed. Just as the bust in the financial cycle came much earlier than in most other episodes of financial crisis, recovery also appears to be delayed.
What went wrong? The Turkish crisis has a number of features common to crises in emerging markets that implemented exchange-rate-based stabilization programs. Such programs typically use the exchange rate as a credible anchor for inflationary expectations, often leading to currency appreciations and relying on capital inflows attracted by arbitrage opportunities to finance growing external deficits. The consequent build-up of external financial vulnerability eventually gives rise to expectations of sharp currency depreciations and a rapid exit of capital, resulting in overshooting of the exchange rate in the opposite direction and hikes in interest rates.
Through such a boom-bust financial cycle, some countries (e.g. Mexico, Brazil and Russia) have succeeded in overcoming their chronic price instability and avoiding a return of rapid inflation, despite the collapse of their currencies and the external adjustment necessitated by the crisis.
The Turkish program initially followed a similar path, but ran into difficulties at a much earlier stage of the disinflation process, forcing policy-makers to abandon the peg and setting of a sharp economic downturn in the context of a high inflation.
The difficulties arose largely because the program was launched in the face of structural problems and fragilities on many fronts, notably in public finances and the banking sector. In particular, the banking sector was heavily dependent for its earnings on high-yielding T-bills associated with rapid inflation, and was thus highly vulnerable to disinflation. Consequently, there emerged an inconsistency in policy since much of the fiscal adjustment was predicated on declines in the very nominal and real interest rates on which many banks depended for their viability. Furthermore, while the program incorporated a preannounced exit from the crawling peg after 18 months, it failed to meet its inflation targets despite full implementation of its monetary and fiscal policy targets. Thus, what initially looked like a strength of the program backfired, as persistently high inflation, together with widening current account deficits, fed into expectations of a sharp depreciation of the currency. These shortcomings in the design of the program, rather than a failure to implement it, are the main reason why the boom in capital inflows was much shorter in Turkey than in most other experiments with exchange-rate-based stabilization, and why the crisis broke out before inflation was brought under control.
It should also be recognized that recent bouts of liquidity crises in emerging markets have significantly eroded the confidence of international investors in the sustainability of such soft pegs, triggering rapid exits in the first signs of trouble. In this sense the Turkish experience also suggests that the chances of successful disinflation by means of an exchange-rate anchor may now be significantly lower. Indeed, the behaviour of private capital flows to emerging markets in the current global downturn shows that, unlike in the first half of the 1990s, the international investors have become much more nervous in raising their exposure to emerging markets despite falling investment opportunities in the major industrial countries (UNCTAD 2001a) .
That the Turkish crisis has proved much deeper than most crises in emerging markets is not only due to problems in the design of the stabilization program. Equally important is mismanagement in crisis intervention, which has been premised, as in most other emerging markets, on restoring confidence, maintaining capital-account convertibility and meeting the demands of creditors through fiscal and monetary tightening. While the implementation of the program had created a trade off between public and private finances, abandoning the peg and moving to free floating under full capital account convertibility and extensive dollarization aggravated the difficulties of both public and private sectors. The collapse of the currency hit hard those sectors with high exposure to exchange rate risks which the earlier peg had encouraged. Public finances were squeezed from rising external and domestic debt servicing obligations due to the collapse of the currency and the hike in interest rates. Fiscal austerity and monetary tightening have served to deepen recession, and even growth in exports has remained relatively modest despite the sharp depreciation of the currency because of disruptions in the credit and supply systems, in very much the same way as in the earlier phase of the crisis in East
Asia. Various packages of legislation passed in order to initiate structural reforms in the public and private sectors failed to restore confidence while their initial impact has been to add to stagflationary pressures. Furthermore, the external economic environment has deteriorated further with the downturn in the major industrial countries and the events of 11 September.
However, these events have also helped Turkey in mobilizing unprecedented amounts of external support from the IMF due the strategic position that the country occupies in the United States' "war against terrorism". Despite four IMF bailout packages in two years, however, the economy shrunk at an unprecedented rate of some 9.5 per cent in 2001, and prospects for a strong recovery are highly uncertain.
The build up of imbalances: Inflation, debt and capital flows
Many of the imbalances and fragilities that characterised the Turkish economy at the turn of the century had their origin in the policies pursued in the previous two decades. Turkey started the 1980s with a stabilization-cum-liberalization experiment under a military rule in response to a deep debt and balance of payments crisis beginning in late 1970s. The program enjoyed some initial success and was widely praised as an example of successful transition from an inward to an outward development strategy and generously supported by multilateral institutions.
2 Inflation was brought down from three digit levels in 1980 to some 30 per cent in the subsequent two years, and the cost of disinflation in terms of foregone output was relatively small, with GDP contracting by some 2 per cent in 1980. This was followed by an export-led growth, with manufacturing exports growing at double-digit rates, supported by favourable exchange rates and massive incentives in the form of tax rebates. The average GDP growth rate stayed above 6 per cent per annum during 1983-1987. Initially the program achieved a strong macroeconomic adjustment. The current account deficit was halved during 1981-1982 from a level of 5 per cent of GDP at the beginning of the decade while public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) fell from around 10 per cent of GNP to less than 4 per cent during the same period. However, macroeconomic imbalances reappeared after 1987. While the current account registered either a surplus or a small deficit, the PSBR reached almost 10 per cent of GNP at the end of the 1980s. Again, inflation accelerated rapidly from 1987 onwards, exceeding on average, 60 per cent during the last three years of the decade.
2 For various aspects of this experience see a collection of papers in Aricanli and Rodrik (1990) .
Two factors appear to have played a significant role in the re-emergence fiscal imbalances and the acceleration of inflation. First, the macroeconomic adjustment and export push had been achieved in large part through drastic cuts in real wages and reduced support to agricultural producers both during the military regime of 1980-1983 and the subsequent civilian government that came to power in a highly repressive political environment. The return to hotly contested elections and parliamentary democracy after 1987 led to popular demands and compensatory policies (Boratav and Yeldan, 2001) . Second, contrary to orthodox rhetoric on sequencing, domestic financial markets was liberalized before fiscal discipline had been secured and inflation brought under control. Deregulation of interest rates and the shift from central bank financing to direct security issues raised the cost of financing of public sector deficits: even before the acceleration of inflation in 1988, interest rates on government paper exceeded the rate of inflation by between 10 and 20 percentage points. As a result, public domestic debt and interest payments as a proportion of GDP started to rise from mid-1980s.
Thus, towards the end of the decade the economy had run out of steam and public sector deficits and inflation had come back with full force. The policy response was to liberalize fully the capital account in 1989. The foreign exchange regime had already been liberalized in certain respects in 1984, bringing current account convertibility and allowing residents to hold foreign currency deposits in domestic banks and to engage in specified foreign exchange transactions.
New legislation in 1989 effectively lifted restrictions on inward and outward financial transactions by residents and non-residents alike, thereby exposing the economy to the whims of international capital flows.
An implicit objective of capital account liberalization was to facilitate the financing of public sector deficits without crowding-out private investment. However, the outcome was to aggravate the fiscal problem, forcing the government to pay an even higher spread compared to safer dollar assets which became easily accessible even for small savers. During the 1990s interest rates on government debt exceeded the inflation rate, on average, by more than 30 percentage points. With inflation averaging some 75 per cent, this meant a real rate of interest of almost 20 per cent (table 1) . Two factors appear to have played a crucial role in pushing up the rate of interest on government debt. First, dollarization reduced the transaction costs of entry and exit into foreign assets, raising their net return. Second, instability of the inflation rate raised the risk of assets denominated in domestic currencies, raising the spread; during the decade as a whole, the standard deviation of annual average rate of inflation was 15 percentage points.
These factors accelerated the currency substitution, raising the share of foreign exchange deposits held by residents in total bank deposits from 25 per cent in 1990 to 43 per cent in 1999.
Rate of interest earned on dollar deposits rose rapidly, reaching double digit figures after 1997.
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The outcome was a rapid build up of public debt and the emergence of a financial system which came to depend on arbitrage margins offered by high rates on government debt in comparison with international borrowing and domestic deposits, including forex deposits, at the cost of large currency risks. Government was increasingly engaged in Ponzi financing whereby rising interest payments could only be met by issuing new debt instruments. Thus, while interest payments on domestic debt absorbed less than 20 per cent of tax revenues at the end of the 1980s, this proportion rose steadily throughout the 1990s exceeding 75 per cent at the end of the decade. The PSBR rose rapidly during the same period reaching, on IMF definition, 24 per cent of GDP. While primary deficits in the first half of the decade played an important role in pushing up the PSBR, interest payments became by far the most important component of fiscal deficits in the second half of the 1990s. New public debt instruments (bonds and bills) issued to meet budget deficits rose from less than 6 per cent GDP at the beginning of the 1990s to almost 40 per cent at the end of the decade. Table 1 TURKEY: MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS, 1990 INDICATORS, -2000 INDICATORS, 1990 INDICATORS, 1991 INDICATORS, 1992 INDICATORS, 1993 INDICATORS, 1994 INDICATORS, 1995 INDICATORS, 1996 INDICATORS, 1997 INDICATORS, 1998 INDICATORS, 1999 INDICATORS, 2000 GDP growth rate 9.3 0.9 6.0 8. Like many other emerging markets with open capital accounts, Turkish financial markets, interest rates and exchange rates went through large swings during the decade, associated with boom-bust cycles in international capital flows. The increased financial instability was almost fully mirrored by ups and downs in economic activity. From 1990 to 2001, while the average growth rate of GDP was around 3 per cent, its standard deviation was twice as large, reaching 6 percentage points. Such a degree of instability was unprecedented, not seen even during the turbulent decade of the 1970s when the economy faced a series of large positive and negative external shocks due to sharp changes in workers' remittances and oil prices. Increased fluctuations in economic activity has been accompanied by greater instability in fixed capital formation, with attendant consequences for the long-term growth potential of the economy.
3
The initial boom coincided with the surge in capital inflows to Latin America in the early 1990s which eventually culminated in the Mexican crisis of 1994 -1995 . Between 1990 and 1993 , cumulative net capital inflows by non-residents reached $25 billion while the current account deficit remained below $10 billion (table 2) . 4 Only a small part of the surplus was 4 The empirical specifications of capital flows used in tables 2 and 3 follow the conventions in IMF's Balance of Payments Statistics. Capital inflow refers to the acquisition of domestic assets by non-residents. Sales of domestic assets are defined as a negative capital inflow. Net capital inflows denotes acquisition minus sales of domestic assets by non-residents. Capital outflow refers to the acquisition of foreign assets by residents. Sales of foreign assets are negative capital outflows. Net capital outflows denote acquisitions minus sales of foreign assets by residents. Net capital flow refers to net capital inflows less net capital outflows as defined above. It is positive when net inflows exceed net outflows. For a further discussion of these concepts see UNCTAD (1999, box 5.1, p. 100). absorbed by increases in reserves while a large proportion was used to finance net capital outflows by residents who apparently took the opportunity offered by the new capital account regime to diversify their portfolios by acquiring assets abroad. As expected, the boom in capital inflows was associated with an appreciation of the currency, a strong recovery during [1992] [1993] and widening current account deficits. Between 1990 and 1993, the average inflation was around 65 per cent, average annual increase in the dollar against the lira was 52 per cent while the average interest rate on short-term government debt was over 85 per cent (table 1). The boom was followed by a bust in 1994, about a year before the outbreak of the Mexican crisis, with a and the current account swung into surplus as a result of massive cuts in imports.
As in Mexico the downturn was short-lived and the recovery rapid. Capital flows returned during 1995-1997 when the economy enjoyed three successive years of growth in excess of 7 per cent. During that period currency appreciation was generally avoided as the Central Bank of Turkey (CBT) effectively pursued a policy of real peg. This together with the initial real depreciation of the lira meant a sharp recovery in exports which helped to keep the current account at sustainable levels despite rapid growth. As net capital outflows by residents also slowed down, much of the capital inflows was absorbed by increases in international reserves (table 2) . Such flows were attracted in large part by short-term arbitrage opportunities as interest rates on public debt remained well above the rate of inflation and the rate of depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. However, capital inflows slowed sharply after the East Asian crisis, falling from 5.8 per cent of GNP in 1997 to 1.8 per cent in 1998. Growth was halved compared to the previous three years and the current account went into surplus. The fallout from the Russian crisis and a devastating earthquake in 1999 pushed the economy into a deep recession with GDP falling close to 5 per cent. While a currency crisis was averted over the turbulent years of 1998-1999, the banking sector felt the squeeze from tightened external financial conditions and contraction in economic activity. Eight insolvent banks had to be taken over by the public Saving Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF), in accordance with the full insurance granted to deposits after the 1994 crisis, thereby adding considerably to public debt and deficits.
Thus, on the eve of the launching of the 1999 stabilization program, the Turkish economy was characterised by a sharp contraction of economic activity and serious difficulties in the banking system. By contrast the external sector looked relatively healthy. The balance of payments position was sustainable and the currency did not seem to be out of line with the underlying fundamentals as the earlier appreciation had to a large extent been corrected by the sharp decline in 1994, and the CBT effectively followed a policy of an adjustable peg designed to prevent a significant real appreciation of the lira. This was also the view expressed in an IMF staff report issued on the eve of the stabilization program: "Taken as a whole, the results suggest that the lira could appreciate by about 10 per cent from its 1998 average while remaining consistent with a sustainable current account deficit. ... using the criterion of stabilizing the net debt-to GDP ratio, the analysis in this chapter suggests that Turkey's real exchange rate was 
The stabilization program
The government launched a stabilization program in December 1999 after extensive consultations with the Bretton Woods Institutions, supported by an IMF stand-by credit. This preannounced exit from the peg was considered a major strength of the Turkish program compared to earlier experiments with exchange-rate-based stabilization, particularly in Latin America. Such programs had often been criticized on the grounds that they were launched without adequate attention to the potential problem of real currency appreciation and without a clear exit strategy as to when and how to alter the currency peg or the regime and realign the exchange rate (Eichengreen et al. 1998; and Fischer 2001) . Appreciation is not only unavoidable because of stickiness of domestic prices, but more fundamentally, it is part of the rationale of successful disinflation, since greater exposure to international trade -resulting in lower real import prices and increased competition in export markets -helps to discipline domestic producers and acts as a break on income claims. Although, economically it may appear simple to restore international competitiveness by a one-off adjustment in the exchange rate, governments are often unwilling to abandon the peg and devalue after exerting considerable effort in attempting to convince people that the peg brought them more good than harm. They are also afraid of losing the confidence of markets and facing a sharp reversal of capital flows and a collapse of the currency. But delaying exit aggravates currency misalignments and external imbalances, eventually making it difficult to engineer an orderly realignment of the exchange rate.
The need to avoid these problems and move away from the soft peg is the main reason why an exit strategy was explicitly built into the Turkish stabilization program (Fischer, 2001, p. 9; and IMF 2000b, p. 48; IMF 2001a, p. 137) . However, it was also a gamble on the pace of disinflation; a failure to meet inflation targets could reinforce expectations of a sharp depreciation at the time of the preannounced exit date, risking an earlier attack on the currency.
This was, in the event, what happened in Turkey.
The program also provided for a "quasi-currency board" whereby money printing against domestic assets was precluded. For the end of each quarter an upper ceiling was set to the stock of net domestic assets of the central bank at the level reached in December 1999, while some flexibility was allowed within the quarter. As the CBT was committed not to engage in sterilization, macroeconomic equilibrium was to be attained mainly through changes in interest rates: if capital inflows fell short of the current-account deficit, liquidity would be withdrawn from the economy and interest rates would rise, thus restoring external equilibrium by attracting more capital, on the one hand, and by restraining domestic demand and imports, on the other.
Fiscal goals included an improvement in the primary balance of the consolidated public sector, to yield a surplus in 2000 to be attained primarily with additional taxation, cuts in current public primary spending and funds generated by pension reform. This was seen to be sufficient to stabilize the public debt-to-GDP ratio over the medium term. However, disinflation was expected to result in a temporary rise in the burden of interest payments, as a proportion of GDP, on previously issued fix-rate securities, and revenues from privatization were to provide the resources needed to keep the public-debt-to-GDP ratio at its 1999 level.
All these were to be supported by incomes policy and upfront structural reforms. Salary increases for civil servants were to be set in line with the inflation target for the first six months, but would be fully adjusted subsequently for any excess inflation over the target, implying indexation to past inflation. Rationalization of agricultural policies and the pension system, improvement in fiscal management and tax administration, privatization of state-owned enterprises, including in particular Turk Telekom, and strengthening of the banking system and banking regulations were among the structural reforms agreed with the IMF.
Crisis mark I
In the event, during the course of 2000 the targets for the nominal exchange rate, net domestic assets and primary budget deficits were all attained, but prices proved to be stickier than expected. The CPI inflation on a year-to-year basis started to fall steadily after February 2000, but the pace was slow and the end-year target was overshot by some 15 percentage points.
At the end of December 2000, the year-to-year change in the CPI was 39 per cent while the average inflation for the year as a whole reached 55 per cent compared to 65 per cent in the previous year. Given that the predetermined path for the nominal exchange rate had been followed, this resulted in a significant appreciation of the currency in real terms. This was also aggravated by the rise of the dollar against the euro.
By the standards of other recent exchange-rate-based stabilization programs the Turkish inflation target did not look overambitious. For instance in nine such programs implemented between 1985 and 1998 in a number of countries, at the end of the first year the inflation rate was reduced, on average, to one quarter of its initial level (IMF, 2001a, figure 4.7, p. 137) . In the Mexican program, the inflation rate fell from over 110 per cent to 20 per cent after one year.
Under the plano real Brazil reduced inflation from an almost four digit level in 1994 to around 22 per cent in 1995. In most of these cases, as in Turkey, there was considerable inertia as inflation had lasted for several years. In Turkey, a number of additional factors account for the relative rigidity of inflation. First, a trade-off emerged between fiscal adjustment and inflation since reducing losses of state owned enterprises required increases in their prices. Secondly, wage increases in the public sector often exceeded the inflation target by a large margin as a result of implementation of collective agreements reached in previous years while in the private sector wage settlements continued to be based on backward indexation. Finally, certain components of CPI, notably rents, rose much faster than the inflation target.
Interest rates fell significantly faster than the rate of inflation, and indeed much faster than expected, even though they were highly volatile: annualized rates on 3-month T-bills averaged around 38 per cent in January-November 2000, compared to over 100 per cent in 1999.
The average T-bill real interest rate was negative both in forward-looking and backward-looking terms (table 4) . This was greeted with enthusiasm since earlier attempts at stabilization had failed to lower interest rates despite some success in disinflation (IMF, 2000b, p. 46 against a target of 3.6 per cent. This, together with the decline in interest rates and the sharp improvement in the primary budget balance, was sufficient to cut the operational deficit as a proportion of GDP by a large margin and stabilize, and in fact reduce, the public debt ratio (table 4) . 7 There was some ambiguity regarding the role that privatization of Turk Telekom was to play in stabilization. On a question on the implication of a failure to do so, the IMF responded that "privatization is not a condition per se in the program. The policy implementation to make privatization possible is a condition. We clearly recognize the difficult environment both in terms of within Turkey but also the world market in telecom, so that we clearly do recognize that as a problem", IMF and investment by non-residents. By contrast, there was a net acquisition of assets abroad by residents, suggesting that despite large return differences, they were reluctant to concentrate their asset holdings in the country. Similarly, forex deposits held by residents in domestic banks rose both in absolute terms and as a share in total commercial deposits. While interest rates on forex deposits remained broadly unchanged at double digit levels (averaging around 10-13 per cent according to maturity, see TCMB, 2001, pp. 37-38) , there was a sharp drop in rates on lira deposits. Although the difference was much greater than the preannounced rate of depreciation of the currency, the Turkish savers were reluctant to undo their forex deposits and shift to lira and, unlike financial intermediaries, to take the consequent exchange rate risk.
Over 90 per cent of net capital inflows by non-residents were debt-creating, with FDI and portfolio inflows adding no more than $1.5 billion out of $15.2 billion of net private capital inflows. Three items constituted more than 80 per cent of total net capital inflows; international bond issues by the public sector ($5.7 billion), short-term bank credits from abroad ($3.6 billion), and long-term bank credits ($3.2 billion). Since investment and lending in domestic currency by non-residents were a small proportion of total net capital inflows, currency risk was borne largely by borrowers. Clearly, the rise in international reserves, strong as they were, would not have been sufficient to sustain external payments in the event of an interruption of capital inflows. While at the beginning of the year reserves were just enough to cover short-term external debt, at the end of the year short-term debt exceeded reserves by 50 per cent, similar to the figure in Thailand on the eve of the 1997 crisis. Again, the ratio of the current account deficit to reserves rose from 10 per cent to 50 per cent during the same period.
Thus, the Turkish exchange-rate-based stabilization program followed a familiar path with a surge in capital inflows, an upturn in economic activity, a significant appreciation of the currency, mounting trade deficits, worsening balance sheets and rising exchange rate risks.
However, compared to most other recent exchange-rate-based stabilization programs that also ended in crash, in Turkey the boom in capital inflows lasted much shorter and the crisis broke out before any significant progress could be made in disinflation. On the eve of the outbreak of The events that eventually led to a rapid exit of capital in November included disappointing inflation results for October, unexpectedly high monthly trade deficits, political difficulties encountered in privatization, worsening relations with the EU, the economic situation in Argentina, and disclosure of irregularities in the banking system and a criminal investigation into several banks taken over by the SDIF. There may also have been a rush to liquidity due to competitive maneuvering among some private banks. Within a few days the CBT reversed its policy and, evidently after the insistence of, and securing commitments from, the IMF, reinstated the currency-board rule with a new ceiling on domestic assets. As liquidity injection was discontinued and reserves were still sufficient to meet short-term external liabilities, capital outflows stopped, but interest rates shot up with overnight rates reaching four-digit levels. At the beginning of December a new agreement was reached with the IMF, including a financial package of some $10.5 billion, including $7.5 billion, or 600 per cent of Turkey's quota in the IMF, from the Supplemental Reserve Facility.
The government undertook fresh commitments, including further spending cuts and tax increases, dismantling of agricultural support policies, liberalization of key goods and services markets, financial sector restructuring and privatization. It also extended guarantees for foreign creditors as well as all depositors of local banks in order to help restore confidence in the banking system. 
Crisis mark II
The IMF support and new commitments by the government appeared to stabilize the currency and financial markets at the end of 2000, halting capital outflows. By mid-January international reserves had been replenished, exceeding their pre-crisis level, and interest rates had fallen below 60 per cent. Imports slowed down with the weakening of aggregate demand, and inflation continued to fall even though it was twice the rate of the crawl. Even in the middle of the November crisis the IMF appeared fully confident that the program was working:
10 This move appears to have had the full support of the Managing Director of the IMF: "I particularly welcome the government's firm commitment to implement a bold set of measures to strengthen the soundness of the banking sector aimed at tackling the root causes of the current problems. I welcome the firm action already taken in this respect, including the decision to protect depositors and other creditors in Turkish banks", IMF, News Brief No. 00/113, December 6, 2000.
The disinflation and fiscal adjustment program launched by the Turkish government in late 1999 has achieved important results: inflation this year will be the lowest since the mid-1980s; growth has picked up strongly; and public indebtedness, which was rising steeply in relation to GDP last year, is now falling. ... In sum, the program is on track, and it is expected to remain so given the authorities' strong policies for 2001 (Fischer) . While the government was on the one hand trying to stabilize its debt by creating large primary surpluses and converting domestic debt to external debt, it was on the other hand adding to its liabilities by capitalizing the banks taken over by the SDIF and meeting the losses of state banks exposed to mounting interest rates. After the November crisis, the public sector had to issue securities amounting to 2 per cent of GNP to capitalize the banks taken over by the SDIF (IMF 2001c, pp. 7-8; see also Box 1, p. 10 and table 5, p. 78).
Even though fiscal and monetary performance criteria were generally met throughout the year, stabilization and growth proved elusive. Inflation and interest rates remained well above projections, and the exchange rate continued to overshoot under speculative pressures in a rather thin market, dropping to TL 1.6 million per dollar towards the end of the year as the CBT stoodby and watched, to recover only on the news that the Fund would provide some additional finance. The government only gradually came to grasp the gravity of the situation:
We have revised our macroeconomic projections for 2001 in light of recent data. We now project a fall in real GNP for 2001 as a whole of 5 ½ percent, compared with the original program projection of a decline of 3 percent. ... For the whole year, we now expect CPI inflation to be 58 percent, compared with the originally projected 52.5 percent.... The external current account balance is expected to show a US$5 billion (3 per cent of GNP) surplus for the year (compared with the originally projected broad balance) (IMF 2001d, pp. 1-2).
Again, the program remained on track with respect to its macroeconomic policy performance indicators and structural reforms in the following months, but its growth and inflation targets were off the mark, which forced the government to revise its projections once more:
A steeper-than-expected decline in the second quarter had already suggested a need to revise downward our earlier projection of real GNP growth of -5.5 percent in 2001. The September 11 shock has further delayed the recovery, and we now estimate real GNP to decline by 8.5 percent this year.... As regards inflation, the further currency depreciation suggests that our end-year CPI inflation projection needs to be increased from 58 to 65 percent.... Finally, the economic slowdown and the depreciation of the Turkish lira have led to a marked turnaround in the external current account in 2001, with a surplus of US$2¼ billion projected for the full year despite the anticipated loss of tourism and export receipts in the last quarter (IMF 2001e, p. 2).
The move to floating under conditions of fiscal imbalances, high inflation and financial fragility has presented serious policy dilemmas. Under the previous regime of crawling peg, while interest rates were allowed to move in response to capital flows, the peg was expected to bring down inflation and nominal and real interest rates and to facilitate fiscal adjustment. As noted above, capital flows indeed helped this process by leading to liquidity expansion under the quasi-currency board rule for the monetary policy. The move to floating under distress effectively removed any control policy may have had over exchange rates, interest rates and inflation. Although the currency was left to "market forces" in order to free monetary policy and interest rates from defending a particular exchange rate, the erosion of confidence in the lira and capital outflows tended to reduce liquidity and push up the interest rates, which in turn aggravated the fiscal problem and resulted in further loss of confidence.
Thus, what is often observed in emerging markets applying orthodox recipes in response to capital flight, namely a simultaneous collapse of the currency and hike in interest rates, has appeared with greater force in Turkey because of the presence of additional problems of inflation and fiscal imbalances. There has been little scope to use monetary policy to bring down the interest rate, provide stimulus to the economy and facilitate fiscal adjustment. Not only has there been a limit to monetary expansion in the form of a ceiling to net domestic assets and a floor to international reserves, but also such a move would raise fears of monetization of government deficits. Attempts by the CBT to exert some downward influence on interest rates by expanding liquidity though sale of reserves provided by the IMF had very little effects on the T-bill market.
Under these conditions, hopes were pinned on the return of arbitrage capital so as to stabilize the exchange rate and to bring down interest rates by restoring confidence. In the absence of an effective macroeconomic policy, however, emphasis was placed on political commitment to structural change which created difficulties in the fragile coalition. Again, the IMF became the key player, not only by providing the funds needed to support the fiscal and financial systems, but also the much-needed positive signals to financial markets. Thus, persuaded that implementation of the program was very strong but that the external shock of and recession deepened, many debtors became increasingly insolvent and unable to raise funds to purchase foreign exchange to service their debt, thereby reducing the sales of domestic currency.
In other words, markets have been stabilized not so much by the influx of foreign capital as by deflation, liquidity squeeze and increasing defaults.
Accounting for the crisis: omission or commission?
As in other recent crises in emerging markets, the IMF has come up with a number of ex post facto explanations for why the crisis broke out and why it has proved very deep, putting the blame on slippages in implementation of the policies agreed as well as on some adverse external developments rather than on the design of the stabilization program or misguided intervention in the crisis: "The speculative attack on the Turkish lira took place against the background of increased political uncertainty, policy slippages and a weakening of economic fundamentals" (IMF 2001c, p. 2) . "The Turkish authorities were initially very effective in implementing the IMF-supported program, but they were less successful in coping with unexpected events such the tripling of oil prices, the strong dollar, rising international interest rates, and an overheating economy" (Cottarelli, 2001) . "The recent difficulties in Turkey relate more to banking sector problems, and the failure to undertake corrective fiscal actions when the current account widened, than to the design of the exchange rate arrangement" (Fischer, 2001, p. 9 ).
These explanations have been challenged by many Turkish economists, including some former senior economists of the BWIs, on grounds that the policies advocated were based on a poor diagnosis of economic conditions in the country and the Fund was experimenting with programs that lacked sound theoretical underpinnings (e.g. Kumcu 2001; and Yenal 2001) . It is particularly notable that the program was so designed that there was little policy space left for corrective macroeconomic action in the face of widening current account deficits. By the time the difficulties became apparent, the 2000 budget had already been finalized according to the deficit targets set in the program, and there was effectively little room either on the spending side or on the revenue side to act rapidly to slow demand expansion. This role could have certainly been played by monetary policy, but this had been ruled out by the quasi-currency board and non-sterilization rules incorporated in the stabilization program.
There can be little doubt that given the extent of fiscal profligacy and financial fragility, there was no easy way to stabilize the Turkish economy. However, in many respects the Turkish economy today is in a worse shape than it was on the eve of the December 1999 stabilization program. After two years of "policy reforms", the GNP is now lower by 3 per cent as the 9. Anyone who was familiar with the Turkish banking system and the dynamics of the exchange-rate-based stabilization programs could have anticipated the risks entailed by a rapid decline in interest rates as well as the vulnerability of the economy to potential boom-bust cycles in capital flows. Certainly countries such as Brazil have been successful in exchange-rate-based stabilization despite large fiscal imbalances, but in such cases the banking system had undergone an extensive restructuring, and strict supervisory and regulatory provisions had been introduced well in advance (UNCTAD 1999, chap. III) . Again, one of the lessons from East Asian crisis was that the worst time to "reform" a financial system is in the middle of a crisis (UNCTAD 1998, p. iii) . Overhauling the banking system before launching the stabilization program would have helped greatly to avoid many of these difficulties. 15 However, these lessons appear to have been overlooked both in the design of the stabilization program and crisis intervention.
Furthermore, a careful examination of recent experiences with soft-pegs and exchangerate-based stabilization programs shows that many of the weaknesses in economic fundamentals, including currency appreciation, deterioration of the current account and increased exposure to exchange-rate risk, often results from the effects of capital inflows themselves, rather than from policy slippages (UNCTAD 1998, chap. III) . Such episodes are often characterised by an upturn in economic activity and a surge in imports, financed by inflows of arbitrage capital. In Turkey both the Fund and the government were quite happy to see that the economy was making a strong upturn in 2000 after a deep recession in 1999, and they were not willing to discourage the capital inflows underlying this process. As already noted, reserve requirements introduced to discourage open positions were not implemented effectively. More generally, although after the recent bouts of financial crises the Fund has willy-nilly admitted that some such market-based restrictions over arbitrage flows (including the Chilean type reserve requirements) could be useful, it has never encouraged developing countries to check such flows even when it was clear that they could not be sustained over the longer term. On the other hand, the experience shows that even countries with strict fiscal discipline have not always been able to pursue countercyclical policies at times of massive capital inflows to prevent overheating and currency appreciation, and the room in these respects was much more limited in Turkey given the size of 15 Before the stabilization program was launched in December 1999, one of the authors of this paper had urged that priority should be given to legal and institutional arrangements in order to reform the banking system and social security institutions and to bring fiscal discipline before attacking inflation; see Söyle_i/Yilmaz Akyüz, "Türkiye'nin isi zor!", Power, July 1999. See also Milliyet, 6 June 1999.
initial fiscal imbalances and the extent of retrenchment already incorporated in the stabilization program. On the other hand, as noted above, monetary policy was excluded from playing this role by currency-board and non-sterilization rules.
Regarding the external factors it is true that the decline of the euro against the dollar created difficulties for Turkish exports. Nevertheless, as already noted, export performance was quite satisfactory with earnings rising by 7 per cent in 2000, broadly keeping pace with growth in world trade. In any case, according to the Fund's own judgment discussed above, the appreciation of the lira should not have caused a major problem since the currency was estimated to have been undervalued by some 10 per cent on the eve of the stabilization program, and the subsequent appreciation was in the same order of magnitude.
The policy response to the speculative attack on the currency was broadly the same as in previous emerging market crises. The IMF provided funds in order to guarantee repayment of foreign creditors and to ensure the maintenance of convertibility of the lira and free capital movements while promoting tight macroeconomic policies and structural reforms to restore confidence in financial markets. Doubtless, there were some variations around the theme. The
Fund was quick in demanding a move to floating in large part because of increased criticisms from the United States congress that its interventions resulted in using taxpayers' money to defend unsustainable exchange rates and policies, and because the Korean and Brazilian experiences had clearly shown that, as long as capital is free to move, currency pegs cannot be maintained or realigned in an orderly way once confidence is eroded. 16 However, these nuances in the Fund's approach to the Turkish crisis did not make much difference for the final outcome:
16 In Korea the Fund was upset to discover at a late stage that much of the country's forex reserves had been tied in forward contracts in order to stabilize the currency-something that eventually contributed to Fund's insistence on full transparency with respect to central bank balance sheets. In Brazil the 1998 program with the IMF had stipulated an orderly exit from the peg through gradual devaluations throughout 1999, as well as emergency financing, but this did not prevent the collapse of the currency in the wake of the Russian crisis.
the policies advocated failed to restore confidence, the currency collapsed, interest rates skyrocketed, and the economy went into an unprecedented recession in the postwar era. 18 However, the Fund policies in Turkey have shown no significant tendency to depart from past practice. Indeed, as it became clear that the program was no longer viable, the Fund started to harden its position in an effort to shift a greater share of the responsibility onto the government, interfering in such matters as appointments in public bodies which created conflicts within the coalition government. As in Indonesia, this proved to be counterproductive, eroding further the confidence that the Fund and the government were desperately seeking to reestablish and deepening the crisis.
Both the stabilization program and the subsequent crisis intervention in Turkey were designed to overcome instability and excessive indebtedness while meeting fully the claims of the creditors. Unlike in East Asia, however, the latter included domestic lenders to the Turkish government. Indeed, the Turkish debt problem, in so far as it relates to macroeconomic instability, is predominantly an internal one. However, the economy has also been facing difficulties in rolling over its external debt which has reached some $120 billion or 80 per cent of GNP in current dollars. A large proportion of this was incurred in the past decade not so much to finance current account deficits which, as noted above, had remained moderate until the new millennium, as to meet net capital outflows by residents that accelerated after the liberalization of the capital account. The IMF funding has been used in large part to pay foreign private liabilities, notably of banks, as well as to cover the withdrawals of foreign portfolio investors.
This has in effect allowed the government to translate part of its domestic debt into foreign debt.
Standing still and moving forward
Much has been written on possible solutions to the problem of internal debt, but no one has done so more forcefully and with greater persuasiveness than did Keynes in his analysis of what he called "progressive and catastrophic inflations" in Central and Eastern Europe during the early 1920s (see Annex). Thus, borrowing his terms, the Turkish government has been demanding sacrifices from "the active and working elements" of the society in order to be able "to hand over to the rentier or bond-holding class" a large portion of "the fruits of their work"
(the entire tax revenues in 2001), refusing to seek relief in some other ways including "in one or other of two out of the three possible methods" favoured by Keynes.
Clearly, for obvious reasons neither monetization, nor capital levy nor any other measure that could place sizeable burden on the rentier class could be successfully applied when the capital account is open and the domestic currency is fully convertible. In other words, the conditions that make it difficult to manage the external value of the currency also aggravate the difficulties in managing internal debt. Consequently, temporary suspension of convertibility and standstills on external debt payments could provide viable policy options for stabilizing the exchange rate in countries facing international liquidity problems and for orderly workout of external and domestic debt.
These measures have long been advocated by the UNCTAD secretariat drawing on the rationale and key principles for an orderly debt workout as found in domestic bankruptcy procedures, notably chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, in order to overcome the difficulties associated with official bailouts and crisis intervention. 19 The rationale for temporary standstill is the recognition that a grab race for assets by creditors is not only detrimental to the debtor but also to the creditors themselves as a group. The combination of official bailouts and policies advocated to restore confidence, including fiscal and monetary tightening, often fail to check the asset grab race and capital flight, and the collapse of the currencies while deepening the crisis. Furthermore, bailouts create moral hazard for lenders and shift the burden onto debtor countries and their taxpayers, who ultimately pay off the official debt. Nor can bailouts be reconciled with free markets since it is agreed that market discipline will only work if creditors bear the consequences of the risks they take.
Treasury secretary, the IMF now appears to be moving in the direction of establishing some international debt workout procedures. Its First Deputy Managing Director has recently described the new approach in the following terms:
A formal mechanism for sovereign debt restructuring would allow a country to come to the Fund and request a temporary standstill on the repayment of its debts, during which time it would negotiate a rescheduling with its creditors, given the Fund's consent to that line of attack. During this limited period, probably some months in duration, the country would have to provide assurances to its creditors that money was not fleeing the country, which would presumably mean the imposition of exchange controls for a temporary period of time....
Sovereign debt owed to domestic residents may well need to be included in any restructuring for three reasons. First, in the absence of capital controls, balance of payments problems are as likely to arise from the flight of domestic investors and lenders as from withdrawal of foreign ones. Second, domestic debt may impose an unsustainable fiscal burden, especially as the crisis will already be weakening the country's budgetary position by depressing economic activity. Third, external creditors are less likely to agree to a reduction in the value of their own claims if they know that domestic investors are simultaneously being repaid in full or in much greater proportion.
The stay might also apply also to foreign debts owed by nonsovereign residents. This is because of problems created by the use of exchange controls to protect foreign exchange reserves. A company that is relatively unaffected by the crisis ... may suddenly find itself vulnerable to litigation because exchange controls might prevent it paying its overseas creditors during the periods of stay. (Krueger, 2001, pp. 7. 9). 20 This, in effect, amounts to a recognition that the approach so far adopted in official intervention in emerging market crises, built on the principle of maintenance of open capital accounts and convertibility and guaranteed repayment to creditors, may not always be successful in stabilizing the markets and avoiding costly crises. Indeed, as discussed above, this has certainly been the case in Turkey. But, even if orderly debt workouts become part of the international financial architecture, for that country business will continue as usual:
20 There are some differences between UNCTAD and IMF proposals. In the UNCTAD proposal the decision to impose standstill should rest with the debtor country but would then be subject to an examination and endorsement of an independent panel very much along the lines of the WTO safeguards procedures. UNCTAD proposal also includes strict limits on crisis lending. In the IMF proposal, the "standstill would be activated if a request by the debtor country was endorsed by the Fund", Krueger (2001, p. 9) .
A number of our members have expressed a desire to move in this direction. We look forward to discussing our ideas with the Fund's Executive Board next month. But even with unanimous political support this approach could not be in place for at least two or three years. So none of what I have to say tonight has implications for our current negotiations with member countries -Argentina and Turkey, for example (Krueger 2001, pp. 1-2) .
Annex : Keynes on Debt and Inflation
In writing on what he called "progressive and catastrophic inflations" in Central and Eastern Europe during the early 1920s, Keynes characterized the debt problem and possible solutions to it in the following terms:
The active and working elements in no community, ancient or modern, will consent to hand over to the rentier or bond-holding class more than a certain proportion of the fruits of their work. When the piled-up debt demands more than a tolerable proportion, relief has usually been sought in one or other of two out of the three possible methods. The first is repudiation. But except as the accompaniment of revolution, this method is too crude, too deliberate, and too obvious in its incidence. The victims are immediately aware and cry out too loud; so that, in the absence of revolution, this solution may be ruled out at present, as regards internal debt, in Western Europe.
The second method is currency depreciation … The owners of small savings suffer quietly, as experience shows, these enormous depredations, when they would have thrown down a Government which had taken from them a fraction of the amount by more deliberate but juster instruments … It follows the line of least resistance, and responsibility cannot be brought home to individuals. It is, so to speak, nature's remedy, which comes into silent operation when the body politic has shrunk from curing itself.
The remaining, the scientific, expedient, the capital levy, has never yet been tried on a large scale; and perhaps it never will be. It is the rational, the deliberate method. But it is difficult to explain, and it provokes violent prejudice by coming into conflict with the deep instincts by which the love of money protects itself … Once currency depreciation has done its work, I should not advocate the unwise, and probably impracticable, policy of retracing the path with the aid of a capital levy. But if it has become clear that the claims of the bond-holder are more than the taxpayer can support, and if there is still time to choose between the policies of a levy and of further depreciation, the levy must surely be preferred on grounds both of expediency and of justice.
There is a respectable and influential body of opinion which, repudiating with vehemence the adoption of either expedient, fulminates alike against devaluations and levies, on the ground that they infringe the untouchable sacredness of contract; or rather of vested interest … Yet such persons, by overlooking one of the greatest of all social principles, namely the fundamental distinction between the right of the individual to repudiate contract and the right of the State to control vested interest, are the worst enemies of what they seek to preserve. For nothing can preserve the integrity of contract between individuals, except a discretionary authority in the State to revise what has become intolerable. The powers of uninterrupted usury are too great. If the accretions of vested interest were to grow without mitigation for many generations, half the population would be no better than slaves to the other half.
These conclusions might be deemed obvious if experience did not show that many conservative bankers regard it as more consonant with their cloth, and also as economising thought, to shift public discussion of financial topics off the logical on to an alleged 'moral' plane, which means a realm of thought where vested interest can be triumphant over the common good without further debate. But it makes them untrustworthy guides in a perilous age of transition. When … we enter the realm of State action, everything is to be considered and weighed on its merits. Changes in death duties, income tax, land tenure, licensing, game laws, church establishment, feudal rights, slavery, and so on through all ages, have received the same denunciations from the absolutists of contract, who are the real parents of revolution (Keynes, 1971, pp. 53-55) .
